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Abstract
This paper proposes a multi-mode Gaussian modulated continuous variable quan-
tum key distribution (CV-QKD) scheme able to operate at high bandwidth despite
using conventional noisy, coherent detectors. We demonstrate enhancement in shot-
noise sensitivity as well as reduction in the electronic noise variance of the coherent
receiver of the multi-mode CV-QKD system. A proof-of-concept simulation is pre-
sented using multiple modes; this demonstrates an increase in signal-to-noise ratio
and secure key rate at various transmission distances with increasing signal modes
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] is a promising technology for sharing information
with unconditional security. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) [2, 3, 4, 5] based on
quadrature modulation of light is attractive, as it offers higher efficiency in secure key-
generation rates (especially when used in dense wavelength division multiplexing networks
[6]) compared with discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD), which is based on single-photon
encoding and detection [7, 8]. CV-QKD is also very suitable for photonic integration, as
the transceivers are very similar to those in classical coherent high-speed communication
systems [9, 10]. However, classical coherent detectors at higher bandwidth exhibit higher
electronic noise compared with the fundamental vacuum noiseshot noise [11]. This limits
the shot-noise sensitivity of the detector, which is a fundamental requirement for detecting
quadrature modulated quantum signals. Higher electronic noise limits the performance
of CV-QKD systems as it can reduce the signal to-noise ratio (SNR), especially at longer
transmission distances [12]. It is possible to use an intense optical local oscillator (LO)
to cause the shot noise to dominate the Johnson thermal electronic noisethe main source
of electronic noise in the coherent detector [11]. However, this is not achievable at higher
repetition rates due to laser power restrictions in transmitted LO (TLO) CV-QKD systems.
An alternative approach, generating LO locally (LLO), requires a pair of low-linewidth
laser sources whose phase-mismatching error with respect to each other creates additional
noise that limits long-distance performance [13, 14, 15].
Here, we propose a new scheme for CV-QKD with a multi- mode Gaussian modulated
protocol [2, 4] that exhibits higher SNR compared to a conventional high-bandwidth CV-
QKD system. Multi-mode signals in CV-QKD have been considered in [16, 17, 18] for
Gaussian as well as in [19, 20] for discrete modulation protocols. The basic feature of our
scheme involves the transmission of multi-mode, mutually incoherent signals prepared by
Alice and their joint measurement at once using a coherent detector by Bob. Here, by the
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term mode, we mean orthogonal states in any degrees of freedom of the light. We have
selected the wavelength, as it is practically easier to generate different modes and is not
as limited in number of degrees compared to other modes such as polarization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the conventional Gaussian
modulation CVQKD protocol and a set of equations useful for the estimation of final secure
key rate. In Section 3, we consider the basic assumptions of the detector for performing
CV-QKD. A multi-mode scheme for enhancing the SNR will be discussed in Section 4,
and principle demonstration and simulation results as to the gain in secure key rate will
be given in Section 5. Conclusions will be given in Section 6.
2 Gaussian modulated CV-QKD
In a Gaussian modulated CV-QKD system, Alice prepares coherent state |αA〉 = |XA + iPA〉
and sends to Bob through a quantum channel. The quadratures, XA and PA, are drawn
from two sets of normally distributed random variables N{0, VA}, of zero mean and vari-
ance VA. Bob measures the quadratures with respect to a reference signal- LO, using
a shot noise limited homodyne [2] or heterodyne [4] coherent receiver. Without loss of
generality, we consider a homodyne detection scheme where Bob randomly measures one
of the quadratures, XB or PB. The LO can be either transmitted from Alice (TLO)[21]
or generate locally at Bob (LLO) from a second laser [13, 14]. In the latter scheme, Alice
also needs to send a reference signal to lock the phase of the laser at Bob. The quantum
channel is characterized by two parameters, transmittance T and excess noise ξ, which
can be estimated using the following equations:
< XAXB > =
√
ηTVA (1)
var(XB) = VB = ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vele (2)
Where, η is the detection efficiency of Bob, N0 is the shot noise variance and vele
is the electronic noise variance expressed in shot noise unit (snu or otherwise labeled as
N0). The l.h.s of Eq.(1) is the covariance between XA and XB. Above equations hold
true for PB quadrature measurements as well. With the help of data reconciliation, in
particular reverse reconciliation[22] for channels with loss greater than 3dB, Alice and
Bob can extract secure keys from correlated quadrature values {X1A..XN/3A , X1B..XN/3B } by
preforming error correction and privacy amplification[23]. Here we assume one third of the
total number of N measured quadratures values are used for channel parameter estimation
and one third is for real-time shot noise variance measurement. From the estimated values
of the channel parameters, T and ξ, secure key generation rate can be estimated. Secure
key rate in asymptotic limit, under collective attack, can be written as [24]:
K = γ(βIAB −min{χEB, χEA}) (3)
Here, γ is the fraction of quadrature data used for secure key generation and β is
the reconciliation efficiency. IAB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob and
χEA, χEB are the Holevo bounds to Eves accessible information [25], for the quadrature
prepared by Alice and Bob’s quadrature measurement outcomes, respectively. χEA per-
tains to the direct reconciliation where Bob corrects his noisy measurement outcomes with
respect to Alice. While in reverse reconciliation, Alice corrects initial quadrature infor-
mation as per Bob’s noisy measurement outcomes. In this case, Eve is forced to gather
knowledge about Bob’s measurements, χEB, in order to maximize her eavesdropping. In
reverse reconciliation, the noise in Bob’s measurements improves the robustness of the
protocol to the channel excess noise by partly decoupling eavesdropper from the Bob’s
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measurement outcomes and helps to extend the transmission distance beyond 3dB limit
in the case of direct reconciliation. The total noise, χtot = χline+χhom/T , in the CV-QKD
system is separated into two. The channel noise χline = (1−T )/T + ξ and detection noise
χhom = (1−η+vele)/η. It is assumed that the electronic noise variance, vele, and detection
efficiency, η, cannot be accesed by Eve so that both can be calibrated and trusted [21].
This applies in the reverse reconciliation procedure and so we restrict our calculation to
it. Here, vele plays a role in SNR. One can find the signal to noise ratio in the system as:
SNR = VA/(1 + χtot) and then estimate the mutual information IAB from the following
equation:
IAB =
1
2
log2(1 + SNR) (4)
In order to estimate the Holevo bound for Eve’s accessible information, χEB, under
collective attack on the Gaussian states sent by Alice, one can use the equation below:
χEB = S(ρE)−
∫
p(XB)S(ρE|B)dXB (5)
where, S(ρE) is the Von Neumann entropy of the state that Eve poses, p(XB) is the
probability distribution of Bob’s measurements, and ρE|B is Eve’s states conditioned on
Bob’s measurement. Please refer to appendix A for further description on Eq.(5). From
the parameters estimation, if the level of excess noise ξ is below the null key threshold,
Alice and Bob can estimate the secure key rate, Eq.(3), and proceed to error correction
and privacy amplification in order to generate unconditional secure keys.
3 Prerequisite for performing Gaussian modulated CV-QKD
In order to guarantee the security of a protocol, it is necessary to put forward assumptions
on the underlying hardware systems and the way they perform. In CV-QKD protocols,
quantum uncertainty imposed by the shot noise on the quadrature measurements provides
the fundamentals to the theoretical security [2]. For this, it is assumed that the coherent
receiver that detects the quadratures does have adequate sensitivity to infer the quantum
uncertainty from the measurement outcomes. Such receivers are referred as ”shot noise
limited”. It is also assumed that the transfer function of the quantum channel, together
with subsequent detection by the detector, follows a linear Gaussian model such that
the variance of the output signal as well as the induced noises are Gaussian and linear
with respect to the input signal. This requires a receiver with linear response function
where the variance of the detector output is linear with respect to the LO power. A
homodyne receiver typically consists of a pair of high responsive linear photodiodes and
linear transimpedance amplifiers (TIA) [26]. The photo-diodes induce dark current noise
which is, however, negligible compare with the thermal noise from the amplifier, the main
electronic noise in the detector.
In order to make the homodyne detector linear as well as shot noise limited it is
required to use (i) a low-electronic noise amplifier with linear response and (ii) an adequate
LO signal strength to raise the shot-noise variance well above the electronic noise of the
amplifier. Note that the output variance of the homodyne detection is directly proportional
to the LO pulse intensity that interferes with the each of the signal pulses. In this sense,
the number of photons per LO pulse is responsible for the level of shot-noise sensitivity of
the detector [26].
The above mentioned two requirements set the repetition rate and hence the secure
key rate of the CV-QKD system, in general. Most of the demonstrations of CV-QKD
have been limited to low repetition rate, of the order of MHz, as it is difficult to provide
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low electronic noise and high LO intensity in high bandwidth homodyne receivers at high
repetition rate. This implies that at high repetition rate the hardware assumptions to
achieve theoretical security can not be met. Here we closely examin this aspect. The
electronic noise variance, vele of the homodyne receiver system is governed by the thermal
noise of the TIA. One can find an expression for vele in shot noise unit as [27, 28]:
vele =
(√
4kTkRf
G
)2
× BWdλ
hcPLO
(6)
where, k is the Boltzmann constant, Tk is the temperature in kelvin, Rf is the feedback
resistor in the amplifier which is responsible for thermal noise, G is the amplifier gain which
decreases with increasing bandwidth BW . The term defined by the bracket is referred to
as the noise equivalent power (NEP) at the input of the amplifier which can be directly
obtained from the data sheet. In the rest of the Eq.(6), h is planck’s constant, c is the
speed of light and λ, d, PLO are wavelength, pulse width and the power of the LO signal,
respectively. In a high bandwidth CV-QKD realization, in order to keep the electronic
noise significantly below the shot noise variance level, one has to use an amplifier with
low NEP and maximum possible LO power though- both are very hard to be achieved in
practice at high repetition rate. This is because the NEP increases with bandwidth of the
amplifier whereas the achievable LO power- more precisely the number of photons per LO
pulse, decrease with repetition rate as the pulse width decreases.
As a result, elevated electronic noise affects the signal to noise ratio and effectively
reduces the secure key rate. Fig.1 shows variations in vele with respect to repetition rate.
In line with a common practice, here we set the repetition rate is at one third of the
amplifier bandwidth and the LO pulse width to be 10% duty cycle of the repetition rate.
Figure 1: Electronic noise variance, Eq.(6),with respect to repetition rate (blue) and LO
power (black). The following values are used: LO peak power - 1mW at the homodyne
input, pulse width d - 10% of the repetition rate, bandwidth BW- 3 times the repetition
rate and Tk - 300K. The gain G is set to 4000 at 1MHz and assumed linear decrease with
increase in bandwidth.
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As we can see from Fig.1, at high repetition rate vele increases due to decrease in LO
power as well as increase in thermal noise. This results in the reduction in SNR and
thereby the mutual information between Alice and Bob, as per Eq.(4). This limits the
achievable transmission distance and secure key rate.
In the following section we describe muti-mode Gaussian modulated CV-QKD where
a noisy homodyne detector can perform in the linear detection range with a reduction
in electronic noise. This causes an elevation in shot noise sensitivity with respect to the
resultant virtual state - derived from the multi-mode signals, for secure key generation.
4 Multi-mode Gaussian modulated CV-QKD
In a conventional Gaussian modulated CV-QKD system Alice prepares a single mode co-
herent state |α〉, where signal wavelength, polarization, spatial and temporal modes, etc.,
are coherent with respect to that of the LO pulse. In a multi-mode Gaussian modulated
scheme, Alice prepares independent and identically distributed Gaussian modulated coher-
ent states |α〉1 , |α〉2 , .., |α〉m in m independent modes as shown in Fig. 2(b). We assume
modes are well separated from each other such that interference between the signals is
negligible.
Figure 2: Multi-mode CV-QKD Scheme. (a) the virtual coherent state of quadratures XmA
and PmA deduced from the four signal mode quadratures. (b) 4 signal modes (coloured dots)
are shown in respective phase space, with m=4 independent XA and PA quadrature values.
Here, colour codes used for indicating different modes.(c) Bob received the phase rotated
signals. (d) Homodyne measurement of signal quadratures. BS 50/50 beam splitter,
PD photo-diode and TIA transimpedance amplifier. LO pulses pass through a phase
modulator that is not shown in the figure.
Bob then jointly measures, at once, either of the quadratures of each mode using
a single homodyne detector, with m respective mode matched local oscillator pulses as
shown in Fig. 2(d). The joint outcome of his X quadrature measurement at any instance
can be read as:
XmB =
√
ηTΣmi=1XAi + Σ
m
i=1X0i +
√
ηTΣmi=1Xξi +Xele (7)
Here, Xξ, X0 and Xele are the quadrature values of excess noise, shot noise and electronic
noise, respectively. Equation (7) is also true for P quadrature measurement. Considering
the additivity of the Gaussian random variables, the variance V mB = V ar(X
m
B ) of the
measurement outcomes becomes:
V mB = ηTmVA +mN0 + ηTmξ + vele (8)
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The excess noise variance ξ and the shot noise variance N0 are assumed to be identical for
all the modes. Since the shot noise variance at the homodyne output is proportional to
the LO intensity, from a practical point of view, it is not difficult to obtain LO pulses of
identical strength and the same shot noise variance among the modes. While comparing
Eq. (2) of single mode output variance with Eq. (8), we can see that the electronic noise
vele remains unchanged. This reads as electronic noise per mode has been lowered by
a factor of total number of modes, m. One may argue that the total noise, including
the shot noise variance, is increased by a factor m. However, normalization of all the
parameters with respect to total shot noise variance- in the resultant virtual phase space,
the contribution of electronic noise is reduced by a factor m.
In order to cope with Bob’s joint quadrature measurement, Alice estimates the re-
sultant, but virtual, quadrature value XmA = Σ
m
i=1X
i
A and P
m
A = Σ
m
i=1P
i
A such that the
resultant quadrature distribution still follows Gaussian distribution N (0,mVA) with mean
zero and variance mVA. A single virtual state is shown in Fig.2 (a). The uncertainty in the
quadrature values are now considered as m times the shot noise variance N0. However,
this will be normalized to unity once joint shot noise variance measurement is done at
Bob.
As a result of the normalization with respect to the shot noise variance, mN0, the
virtual states follow the Gaussian distribution N (0, V m′A ) at Alice where V m
′
A is identical
to VA. Here the superscript m
′ labels the normalized virtual states. Exactly like in single
mode protocol, Alice publicly shares values of her virtual quadratures and Bob estimates
channel parameters, T and ξ, which are common to all the modes, by following Eq.(1) and
Eq.(8),
T =
〈
Xm
′
A X
m′
B
〉2
η(V m
′
A )
2
(9)
ξ =
V m
′
B
ηTm
+ V m
′
A +
1
ηT
+
vele
ηTm
(10)
The SNR of the single mode CV-QKD system is defined as: VA/(1 + χtot), where χtot
is the total noise in the system and its components are defined in the section 2. By taking
them and Eq. (10) into account, the ratio, Rsnr, of SNR in multi-mode to single mode
Gaussian modulated CV-QKD system can be written as:
RSNR =
1 + χtot
1 + χtot/m+ ξ(m− 1)/m (11)
The Eq.(11) is plotted in Fig.3 in order to shows the enhancement in SNR of multi-
mode system. Here we assume that channel loss and detector response to each of the
modes are identical such that contribution of each modes to the quadratures of the virtual
sates are uniformly weighted. And also the quadrature variances of each modes can be set
to identical during the system calibration procedure - which is a normal routine preformed
prior to the protocol run. This lead us to the consider the protocol with final virtual states
follows Gaussian linear model- where the virtual states, the channel noise, the homodyne
detection etc. are identical to single mode Gaussian protocol. As a result, the security
pertaining to the virtual state can be derived exactly as in the case of single mode Gaussian
modulated coherent protocol [24, 25].
Therefore, in order to estimate the final secure key rate from the virtual states, the
following equations are utilized. The mutual information between Alice and Bob, IAB, is
estimated from Eq.(4) while Eve’s information is calculated from Eq.(5) given in appendix
A. And finally utilizing Eq. (3), we can estimate the secure key rate generated from the
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virtual states. As usual, after the parameter and key rate estimation Alice and Bob can
proceed to error correction and then privacy amplification to generate final secure keys.
The LO pulses shown in Fig.2 (d) are either transmitted from Alice or locally generated
at Bob. But, in LLO systems, it may not be necessary to implement multi-mode scheme
proposed here as it possible to generate adequate LO power from the local laser. Therefore
we restrict our claims to the TLO systems. It is worth to mention here that in LLO system,
noise from phase estimation error misalign the reference frame that adds additional noise to
the excess noise which restricts the performance of CV-QKD system to a few 10s of km[15].
For long distance CV-QKD, TLO scheme delivers secure keys as it is less vulnerable to
phase estimation noise and our protocol finds application in high bandwidth and noisy
detection. In order to align the frame of reference of the Alice’s virtual quadrature values
to that of Bob’s joint quadrature measurement outcomes, training signals can be used
for each modes with publicly known phase values[23]. However, the noise from reference
frame misalignment is not considered here.
In order to realize a full setup for our protocol, the cost figure will be primarily due
to the lasers. The modes can be generated with a set of lasers driven by single pulse
generator, the laser outputs can be time delayed and then coupled to a single fibre using
a WDM module. Gaussian quadrature modulation on each modes can be performed with
single amplitude and phase modulators with proper delay in the modulation pattern. At
Bob, an equal fibre delay can be applied to each modes in order to remove the delay offset
by Alice. The calibration procedure helps to set equal weights on quadrature variance,
detector balancing , etc. of each modes.
5 Proof of principle test and simulation results
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of a multi-mode GM-CVQKD system, we have used
a 4MHz bandwidth homodyne detector that typically needs LO strength of 108 photons
per pulse to attain linear response to the shot-noise quadrature and thereby to the signal
quadrature. Here, we are restricted by the bandwidth of the available homodyne detector
in the lab. However, it is possible to demonstrate the core of the concept with lower number
of photon per LO pulse where detector shows non-linear response to the input signal and
lesser shot noise sensitivity. This is exactly the scenario when higher bandwidth homodyne
detectors show non-linear response even at moderate LO power. We test the shot noise
variance of the homodyne detector with 3 different modes of LO pulses, each of 100ns
pulse width and wavelength 1544.53nm, 1545.32nm and 1546.12nm, respectively. Each
LO generates its own contributions to the shot noise variance. The setup is shown as part
of the Fig. 2. The three CW lasers are first multiplexed into a polarization maintaining
fibre and then 100ns pulses are carved out with an amplitude modulator. The signal port
of Bob’s 50/50 beamsplitter is blocked and LO pulses are sent simultaneously though the
LO input port. The output currents from the photo-diodes are first subtracted and then
amplified by low noise amplifier- Amptek A250. The output of the amplifier is acquired by
a real time oscilloscope and processed in the computer, where variances of the homodyne
output signals are estimated over 108 data. Fig.4 shows the output variance of the detector
for different LO pulses strength.
The electronic noise of the detector is 1.56× 10−6mV 2 which is measured without the
LO pulse. The maximum power for each LO mode is limited to 1.7 × 107 photons per
pulse. While using single mode of LO pulse, the achievable minimum electronic noise is
≈ 0.05N0 whereas all the three LO pulses together bring the electronic noise variance
down to 0.005N0- a 10 fold reduction, more than expected, which is due to non-linear gain
of the amplifier. An immediate implication of this demonstrations is that for homodyne
detectors which shows higher electronic noise, especially commercially available coherent
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Figure 3: The ratio RSNR, Eq.(11), of multi-mode signal SNR to that of single mode.
The following parameters are used in the plot: single mode signal variance VA = 2.5N0,
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95, efficiency of Bob η = 0.6 and excess noise at Bob
ηTξ = 0.001N0. Dots and circles represent the SNR ratio for vele = 1.0N0 and 0.1N0,
respectively.
receivers of GHz bandwidths, multi-mode detection can make them sensitive to CV-QKD
signals by significantly reducing the electronic noise variance with respect to shot noise
variance.
To begin with, we have estimated the secure key rate per use of the channel pertaining
to single mode Gaussian modulated CV-QKD protocol under collective attack, Eq.(3)
in two different homodye detector electronic noise levels vele: 0.1N0 and 1.0N0. One
important thing to note here is that vele = 1N0 is a value commonly observed for GHz
bandwidth homodyne detectors, e.g 3GHz bandwidth detector at 1GHz repetition rate-
see Fig.1, and are not considered as shot noise limited. The value 0.1N0 is normally
achievable in CV-QKD systems with repetition rate around 100MHz[29] and detector can
be regarded as shot noise limited.
A m-mode signal transmission can be considered as m independent use of the channel
which is equivalent to the transmission of m single mode signal. However, since Bob
performs joint measurement on m-mode signals at once, the secure key of not equal to
m times the key rate from single mode transmission but higher. This is shown in Fig. 5
as Kmulti/Ksing which is the ratio of the secure key rate of multi-mode to single mode
CV-QKD system for m = 2, 5 and 10. As we can see, muti-mode scheme is less effective
for CV-QKD system at lower repetition rate. But at higher bandwidth- above 1GHz,
the multi-mode scheme brings the following advantages: i) improves the detector’s shot
noise detection sensitivity by reducing the electronic noise variance per mode- here for
8
0 . 0 2 . 0 x 1 0 7 4 . 0 x 1 0 7 6 . 0 x 1 0 7 8 . 0 x 1 0 70 . 0
1 . 0 x 1 0 - 4
2 . 0 x 1 0 - 4
3 . 0 x 1 0 - 4
4 . 0 x 1 0 - 4
5 . 0 x 1 0 - 4
6 . 0 x 1 0 - 4 e l e .  n o i s e  =  1 . 5 6  x  1 0 - 6  m V 2
s h o t  n o i s e  -  1  m o d e
s h o t  n o i s e  -   2  m o d e s
s h o t  n o i s e  -   3  m o d e s
Var
ianc
e (m
V2 )
L O  p h o t o n s / p u l s e
L i n e
a r  D
e t e c
t i o n  
R a n
g e
Figure 4: Measured shot noise variance of the homodyne detector with LO power. Here,
LO pulse width is 100ns at 1MHz repetition rate. With 1.7× 107 photon per pulse, linear
detection range can be reached with 3 LO pulses at which electronic noise per mode drops
to 0.005N0.
m=10, vele = 0.1N0; ii) it shows an increase in the secure key rate with number of
modes. For m=10, it almost doubles the key rate. One thing to mention here is that the
numerical simulation does not consider whether the detector is shot noise limited or not,
but, estimates the key rate under the assumption that vele is trusted and calibrated.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have proposed a multi-mode Gaussian modulated CV-QKD scheme that
conceptually reduces the electronic noise of the homodyne detector and provides shot noise
sensitivity during joint signal measurement.
We have tested the principle behind the muli-mode system using a low bandwidth
homodyne detector with low LO power and have observed a reduction in electronic noise,
and an increase in the shot noise sensitivity. This in turn increases the SNR of the CV-
QKD system. The ratio of secure key rates of the conventional single mode Gaussian
modulated CV-QKD and the multi-mode version has been estimated and found that the
multi-mode scheme has a negligible impact in low bandwidth CV-QKD systems while
at higher bandwidth it provides shot noise sensitivity improvement and higher key rates
compared to single mode systems.
One of the hurdles for higher bandwidth Gaussian modulated CVQKD systems is the
difficulty and latency in data post-processing and hardware requirement for the genera-
tion and acquisition of Gaussian random quadrature values. Discrete modulated CVQKD
systems[30], with two, three or four signal levels, reduce much of these complexities and
there are experimental demonstrations performed at GHz repetition rate [31]. The multi-
mode scheme can not be applied to a discrete modulation scheme as the number of discrete
signal levels of Alice’s resultant virtual state as well as the result of Bob’s joint measure-
ment will increase with the number of modes. The security proofs developed for single
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Figure 5: Gain in terms of key rate in multi-mode CV-QKD is shown for homodyne
detector with low bandwidth (300MHz, vele = 0.1N0) and high bandwidth (3GHz, vele =
1N0). Here we used VA = 2.5N0, reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95, efficiency of Bob
η = 0.6 and excess noise at Bob ηTξ = 0.001N0 and the channel loss = 0.2dB/km. Red
and black colour in the plot indicate vele = 1.0N0 and 0.1N0, respectively.
mode discrete modulated protocols may not be directly applied here. However, in the
limit of large number of modes, the multi-mode discrete modulated scheme will converge
to Gaussian modulation in the virtual quadrature under the central limit theorem. This
needs a careful study on whether security proofs for Gaussian modulation can apply to
multi-mode discretely modulated CV-QKD protocols or not. We hope this paper will
significantly add impact and give direction towards high bandwidth CV-QKD system de-
velopment with currently unattainable repetition rates.
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Appendix A: Eve’s accessible information
The security of prepare and measure based CV-QKD system has been derived from the
entanglement based scheme where Alice and Bob shares joint state ρAB. Alice’s measure-
ment on her state projects Bob’s to a state α identical to what Alice would have sent to
Bob in prepare and measure scheme. The Eq.(5) is further simplified as:
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
(12)
Where G(x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2 x, λ1,2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix that characterize a joint state ρAB and λ3,4,5 are that of the state left
after Bob’s measurement. One can find the eigenvalues as:
10
λ21,2 =
1
2
[A±
√
A2 − 4B], (13)
in which, A = V 2(1 − 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2 and B = T 2(V χline + 1)2 with
V = VA + 1. Similarly,
λ23,4 =
1
2
[C ±
√
C2 − 4D], (14)
where, C = (V
√
B+T (V+χline)+Aχohm)/(T (V+χtot)) andD =
√
B((V+
√
Bχohm)/(T (V+
χtot))) and the last symplectic eigenvalue λ5 is 1. Plugging Eq.(13) and Eq.(14) in Eq.(12)
we can estimate the upper bound of Eve’s accessible information and then the final secure
key rate from Eq.3.
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